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WHISTLEBLOWERS—A CASE STUDY IN THE
REGULATORY CYCLE FOR FINANCIAL
SERVICES
Ronald H. Filler* & Jerry W. Markham**
“Whistleblower—a person who informs on another or
makes public disclosure of corruption or wrongdoing”1
ABSTRACT
The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission were directed by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) to create whistleblower
protection programs that reward informants with massive bounty payments.
At the time of its passage, the Dodd-Frank Act was a highly controversial
statute that was passed on partisan lines. Its whistleblowing authority was
one of its “most contentious provisions.” As the result of the 2016 elections,
the Dodd-Frank Act has come under renewed attack in Congress and by the
new Trump administration. The stage is being set for possible repeal of major
parts of that legislation, including its whistleblowing provisions. The scope
of this anti-retaliation prohibition has also just been narrowly interpreted by
the Supreme Court. This Article shows why the Dodd-Frank whistleblowing
authority was ill-considered, how its present application undercuts other
regulatory programs that seek to prevent and deter violations, and proposes
some reforms.
INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) were directed by the Dodd-FrankWall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) to create
whistleblower protection programs that reward informants with massive
bounty payments.2 At the time of its passage, the Dodd-Frank Act was a
* Ronald H. Filler is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Financial Services Law
Institute at New York Law School.
** Jerry W. Markham is Professor of Law at Florida International University at Miami.
1.Whistle-blower, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/whistle—blower (last
visited Jan. 28, 2018). “The term ‘whistleblower’ originates from a practice of English constables,
who would blow their whistles to inform other officers that help was needed.” Timothy J.
Fitzmaurice, Note, The Scope of Protected Activity Under Section 806 of SOX, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2041, 2046 (2012) (citation omitted).
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §§ 748, 922, 124 Stat. 1380, 1381 (2010) (codified in 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012)). The
Dodd-Frank whistleblower programs seek to protect informants from retaliation by their employers
when reporting violations of securities or commodities laws. They also authorize monetary awards
to whistleblowers when they provide information that results in a successful prosecution, which
assesses civil penalties from which the bounty can be paid. See, e.g., Implementation of the
Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act
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highly controversial statute that was passed on partisan lines.3 Its
whistleblowing authority was one of its “most contentious provisions.”4 As
a result of the 2016 elections, the Dodd-Frank Act has come under renewed
attack in Congress and by the new Trump administration.5 The stage is being
set for possible repeal of parts of that legislation, including its whistleblowing
provisions.6
This process of regulation and deregulation is a now familiar part of the
regulatory cycle for financial services, which operates as follows: (1) a
financial crisis occurs; (2) Congress enacts legislation that supposedly
corrects the regulatory flaws that precipitated the crisis; and (3) when the
economy recovers, complaints of over-regulation lead to a roll back in
regulation.7 This Article advocates an alternative to this regulatory cycle that
uses a more measured approach to the enactment of financial services
legislation. It uses the whistleblowing provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act as a
case study for demonstrating why this regulatory cycle is both ineffective and
inefficient.
Section I of this Article describes the whistleblower programs mandated
by the Dodd-Frank Act and the SEC and CFTC rules and cases implementing
that authority. Section II then traces the creation and history of the financial
regulatory cycle, using some illustrative examples of how that cycle played
out in various financial service sectors. Section III shows how the Dodd-
Frank whistleblowing authority is simply another iteration of those cycles
and how its present application undercuts other regulatory programs that seek
to prevent and deter violations. Finally, Section IV of the Article proposes
reforms addressing the concerns raised by the SEC and CFTC
whistleblowing programs.
Release No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34,300 (June 13, 2011), available at https://www.sec.gov/rule
s/final/2011/34-64545.pdf.
3. See generally Victoria Finkle, Why the Battle Over Dodd-Frank Will Never End, AM.
BANKER (July 1, 2015, 12:21 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-the-battle-over-
dodd-frank-will-never-end (describing why controversy persists over that legislation).
4. Divided U.S. SEC Approves Whistleblower Rule, REUTERS (May 25, 2011, 11:43 AM),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/sec-whistleblower-rule-idUKWEN365220110525.
5. President Trump has promised to do a “big number” on Dodd-Frank. Nathan Dean et al.,
The Trump Era: Rolling Back Financial Regulation, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/trump-era-rolling-back-financial-regulation/.
6. See How the Trump Administration May Impact the Oversight and Enforcement of Dodd-
Frank’s Whistleblower Provisions, NAT’LL. F. (Mar. 6, 2017), http://nationallawforum.com/2017/0
3/06/trump-administration-may-impact-oversight-enforcement-dodd-franks-whistleblower-
protections/ [hereinafter NATIONAL LAW FORUM].
7. See Charles Lane, Republicans Begin Hearings to Peel Back Dodd-Frank, NAT’L PUB.
RADIO (Apr. 26, 2017, 5:03 AM), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/525675210/republicans-begin-
hearings-to-peel-back-dodd-frank (describing this cycle of regulation and deregulation).
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I. THE DODD-FRANKWHISTLEBLOWING AUTHORITY
A. SEC ANDCFTCWHISTLEBLOWINGRULES PROVE TO BE
CONTROVERSIAL
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act directed the SEC to create a
whistleblowing program that protects and rewards employees who provide
information regarding alleged securities law violations by public companies.8
The SEC implemented that authority by adding a new Part 21F to its
regulations.9 Section 748 of Dodd-Frank Act granted the same authority to
the CFTC.10 The CFTC adopted a new Part 165 to its rules implementing that
authority.11 In adopting those rules, the CFTC “endeavored to harmonize its
whistleblower rules with those of the SEC.”12
The SEC’s whistleblowing proposals were approved by a divided vote
(3-2) of the SEC commissioners on May 25, 2011.13 The vote by the CFTC
commissioners on its whistleblowing rules was 4-1.14 The divided votes at
the SEC and CFTC were along party lines and reflected the partisan nature
of the whistleblowing and other provisions in Dodd-Frank.15 Indeed, the SEC
whistleblower rules had “grown to become one of the most contentious
8. Section 922 of Dodd-Frank added a new Section 21F to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which contains the SEC whistleblowing authority. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6
(2012).
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-1 et seq. (2017). The SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower provides
significant information and details related to its whistleblower program.Office of the Whistleblower,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, www.sec.gov/whistleblower/ (last modified Jan. 22, 2018).
In support of its whistleblower programs, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations issued a “Risk Alert” in October 2016, which stated that this Office will analyze and
review internal whistleblower programs offered by broker-dealers and investment advisers. The
Risk Alert warned that the SEC staff, in connection with its examinations and audits of SEC
registrants, will evaluate compliance manuals, codes of ethics, employment agreements, and
severance agreements for whistleblowing concerns. See SEC Off. of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations, Examining Whistleblower Rule Compliance, SEC NAT’L EXAM PROGRAM RISK
ALERT, Vol. VI, Iss. 1, Oct. 24, 2016. The CFTC has also provided guidance on its whistleblowing
programs. The Whistleblower Program, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION,
https://whistleblower.gov (last visited Mar. 24, 2018); see also 17 C.F.R. § 165.
10. Section 748 of Dodd-Frank added this authority to the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.
Dodd-Frank Act § 748, 7 U.S.C. § 26 (2012).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 165.1 et seq. (2017).
12. Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,172 (Aug. 25, 2011) (codified at
17 C.F.R. pt. 165). For information on the CFTC’s whistleblower program, visit its website at:
www.cftc.gov and add “whistleblower” to the search window. See generally Lisa J. Banks, The
CFTC Whistleblower Practice Guide, KATZ, MARSHALL & BANKS LLP (Feb. 2016),
https://www.scribd.com/document/302888133/CFTC-Whistleblower-Practice-Guide (providing
guidance on accessing the CFTC whistleblowing program).
13. Divided U.S. SEC Approves Whistleblower Rule, supra note 4. The statutes authorizing the
appointment of SEC and CFTC Commissioners prohibit more than three members from the same
political party from serving on those Commissions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a); 7 U.S.C. §
2(a)(2)(A)(ii).
14. Whistleblower Incentives and Protection, 76 Fed. Reg. at 53,172.
15. Id.
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provisions required under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street overhaul law.”16
Among other things, critics charged that the new rules would undercut
employer internal compliance programs.17 It is claimed that large monetary
bounties provide employees with an incentive to keep their employers in the
dark about ongoing violations, at least until the SEC acts, a process that could
take years.18
B. SCOPE OF THEWHISTLEBLOWINGRULES
The SEC and CFTC whistleblower rules define a “whistleblower” as a
person “alone or jointly with others” who provides the SEC or CFTC with
information that “relates to a possible violation” of the federal securities or
commodities laws “including any rules or regulations thereunder[] that has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.”19 The rules provide that the
agencies will pay awards to whistleblowers who: (1) voluntarily provide the
agencies; (2) with “original information”; (3) that leads to a successful
federal court or administrative enforcement action; (4) in which the agency
obtains monetary sanctions totaling more than $1,000,000.20 In order to be
eligible for a bounty, the “original information” provided to the SEC or
CFTC must be information that is not available from publicly available
sources and is “derived from [the whistleblower’s] independent knowledge
or independent analysis [that is] [n]ot already known to the Commission from
any other source . . . .”21 The information provided by the whistleblower must
be “sufficiently specific, credible, and timely” to cause the agency staff to
“commence an examination, open an investigation, reopen an investigation
that the Commission had closed, or to inquire concerning different conduct
as part of a current examination . . . .”22
The rules of the SEC and CFTC grant themselves considerable discretion
to decide the percentage (between ten to thirty percent) of the amount of the
bounty awarded to a whistleblower.23 SEC and CFTC rules require the
information provided by the whistleblower and the identity of the
whistleblower to be kept confidential unless such disclosure is required in
16. Divided U.S. SEC Approves Whistleblower Rule, supra note 4.
17. Id.
18. See generally Edward Wyatt, Overcoming Dissenters, S.E.C. Adopts Revised Whistle-
Blower Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2011), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E00E
0DC133AF935A15756C0A9679D8B63 (describing criticism of SEC whistleblower rules).
19. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.21F-2(a) (2017); see also 17 C.F.R. § 165.2(p); see also infra Section D
regarding the recent Supreme Court decision in Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767
(2018), which strictly defined the term “whistleblower.”
20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3(a); see also 17 C.F.R. § 165.2 (similar provisions imposed by the
CFTC).
21. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(1); see also 17 C.F.R. § 165.2(g) (CFTC rule).
22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c); see also 17 C.F.R. § 165.2(i) (CFTC rule).
23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-5; see also 17 C.F.R. § 165.8 (CFTC rule). SEC Rule 21F-6 sets forth
the criteria that the SEC may consider in issuing an award. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6; see also 17
C.F.R. § 165.9 (CFTC rule).
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connection with a federal court or administrative action.24 The SEC and
CFTC whistleblower rules also provide for appeals from decisions made by
the SEC and CFTC in connection with the granting or denying of an award.25
C. AGENCYACTIONS ONWHISTLEBLOWING
The SEC whistleblower program has proved to be popular with tipsters.
In fiscal year 2016, the SEC received over 4,200 whistleblower tips, a forty
percent increase over the first year of the program which began in 2012.26 By
extrapolating these figures, it appears that the SEC has probably received
over 10,000 tips since the implementation of its whistleblower program. By
June 2017, the SEC had awarded over $175 million in bounties to
whistleblowers.27 Several of the SEC’s bounty payments were in the millions
of dollars, including awards of $83 million,28 $30 million, $22 million, $20
million, $17 million and $4 million.29
The CFTC’s whistleblower program has not been as generous or as
popular as the one at the SEC. In fairness, although the whistleblower
numbers at the CFTC pale in comparison to those at the SEC,30 the CFTC’s
regulatory turf is much smaller than that of the SEC, which regulates large
public companies, as well as exchanges, broker-dealers, and other financial
services professionals whose counterparts are regulated by the CFTC.31 The
CFTC’s first whistleblower bounty was not issued until May 2014, and the
whistleblower in that case received a comparatively modest amount of
$240,000.32 Another CFTC whistleblower award was issued in 2016, in
which only $50,000 was awarded.33 However, on April 4, 2016, the CFTC
issued a whistleblower award of over $10 million.34
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-7; see also 17 C.F.R. § 165.4 (CFTC rule).
25. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240. 21F-9–10, 12–13; see also 17 C.F.R. § 165.13 (CFTC rule).
26. See SEC, 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER
PROGRAM 1 (2016), https://www.sec.gov/whistleblower/reportspubs/annual-reports/owb-annual-
report-2016.pdf [hereinafter SEC 2016 ANNUALREPORT].
27. Whistleblower Awards Over $150 Million, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/page/whistleblower-100million (last modified Jan. 23, 2017).
28. The SEC issued its most recent and largest award on March 19, 2018 worth $50 million
being split with two persons and one receiving $33 million. See Press Release, SEC, SEC
Announces Its Largest-Ever Whistleblower Awards (March 19, 2018), available at https://www.se
c.gov/news/press-release/2018-44.
29. See Whistleblower Awards Over $150 Million, supra note 27.
30. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
31. The CFTC also strengthened its anti-retaliation protections for whistleblowers on May 22,
2017. See Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Strengthens Anti-Retaliation Protections for Whistleblowers
and Enhances the Award Claims Review Process (May 22, 2017), available at http://www.cftc.go
v/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7559-17.
32. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Issues First Whistleblower Award (May 20, 2014), available
at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6933-14.
33. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Announces Fourth Whistleblower Award (July 26, 2016),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7411-16.
34. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Announces Whistleblower Award of More Than $10 Million
(Apr. 4, 2016), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7351-16.
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The SEC has otherwise demonstrated an aggressive approach to the
enforcement of its whistleblower rules. For example, in In re NeuStar, Inc.,
35 the SEC accepted an offer of settlement from a public company in an
enforcement action that was the result of disclosures made by a
whistleblower. The SEC found that NeuStar had entered into voluntary
severance agreements that prohibited employees leaving the company from
whistleblowing to the SEC with respect to activities they observed during
their employment.36 The SEC noted that at least 246 NeuStar employees had
signed such severance agreements.37 The SEC’s investigation prompted
NeuStar to remove this provision from its severance agreements and to advise
employees signing such agreements that they were not prohibited from
communicating with the SEC. The respondent also agreed to pay a civil
penalty of $180,000.38
The SEC took even stronger action in In re SandRidge Energy.39 In that
case, SandRidge Energy and twenty-four affiliates filed petitions for relief
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on May 16, 2016.40 The company
then entered into separation agreements with approximately 546 employees,
which stated in part that “a former employee may not . . . at any time in the
future voluntarily contact or participate with any governmental agency in
connection with any complaint or investigation pertaining to [SandRidge] . .
. .”41 The separation agreement also required employees to agree “not to make
any independent use of or disclose to any other person or organization,
including any governmental agency, any of [SandRidge’s] confidential,
proprietary information unless the employee obtained [SandRidge’s] prior
written consent” or to “defame, disparage or make statements or disparaging
remarks which could embarrass or cause harm to SandRidge’s name and
reputation . . . .”42 The SEC consent order required SandRidge to pay a fine
of $1,400,000 to the SEC.43
35. NeuStar, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79593, 2016 WL 7335658 (Dec. 19, 2016).
36. These severance agreements stated: “I [employee] agree not to engage in any
communication that disparages, denigrates, maligns or impugns NeuStar or its officers, directors,
shareholders, investors, potential investors, partners . . . [to] . . . regulators (including but not limited
to the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . .).” Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. SandRidge Energy, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 79607, 2016 WL 7368270 (Dec. 20,
2016).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. There was a whistleblower in the SandRidge case but it is not known whether that person
was given a monetary bounty since most such payments are confidential. Id. NeuStar and SandRidge
were both settled in December 2016. See supra notes 35 and 39. Three other noteworthy
whistleblower cases were settled by the SEC just a few months before NeuStar and SandRidge. See
Health Net, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78590, 2016 WL 4474755 (Aug. 16, 2016); BlueLinx
Holdings Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 78528, 2016 WL 4363864 (Aug. 10, 2016); KBR, Inc.,
Exchange Act Release No. 74619, 111 SEC Docket 917 (Apr. 1, 2015).
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D. JUDICIALDECISIONS ON SECWHISTLEBLOWERS
Several courts have considered the scope and application of the SEC’s
Dodd-Frank whistleblowing rules. For example, the Second Circuit rejected
extraterritorial application of those provisions.44 Other courts have enforced
pre-dispute arbitration agreements with respect to actions by
whistleblowers.45 An issue recently resolved by the Supreme Court was
whether whistleblowers seeking Dodd-Frank protection were required to
make an internal disclosure to their employers and an external disclosure to
the SEC.46 In other words, is it permissible to grant Dodd-Frank protection
to a whistleblower who makes only one such disclosure, either internally to
the employer or externally to the SEC? A split in the circuits had arisen over
this reporting issue.
In Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC,47 the Fifth Circuit held that both
internal and external disclosures are required in order for a whistleblower to
be protected under Dodd-Frank.48 In contrast, the Second Circuit in Berman
v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, deferred to SEC rules that interpreted the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower authority49 to protect a whistleblower who made disclosures
internally to his employer but not externally to the SEC.50 The Ninth Circuit
followed the Second Circuit’s approach in Somers v. Digital Reality Trust,
Inc.51 There, the Ninth Circuit held that the SEC’s whistleblower rules had
correctly implemented congressional intent to protect whistleblowers making
internal disclosures as well as to those making disclosures to the SEC.52 In
essence, the Ninth Circuit supported the language from Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (SOX) that allowed for internal disclosures by a whistleblower to be
sufficient to warrant protection.
On February 21, 2018, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Somers and required whistleblowers, in order to receive the anti-
retaliation protections and any whistleblower awards, to make such
disclosures, at a minimum, to the SEC.53 In a unanimous decision, Justice
44. Meng-Lin v. Siemens AG, 763 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2014).
45. See John K. Lisman, Note, Arbitration Agreement Arbitrage?: Statutory Discrepancy Leads
to Third Circuit Victory for Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Defendants in Khazin v. TD Ameritrade
Holding Corp., 60 VILL. L. REV. 753, 763–64 (2015) (describing these cases).
46. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767 (2018).
47. Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
48. Id.
49. Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 F.3d 145, 155 (2d Cir. 2015).
50. Id. at 153. SEC Rule 21F-4(c) provides for a disclosure either internally within the respective
company or directly to the SEC. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c) (2017).
51. Somers v. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc., 850 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, No. 16-1276,
2017 U.S. LEXIS 4190 (June 26, 2017).
52. See Ronald H. Filler, Ask the Professor: What is the Impact of the Recent 9th Circuit Case of
Paul Somers v. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. et al., on the Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation Provision
Involving Whistleblowers?, 37 FUTURES&DERIVATIVES L. REP., June 2017, at 12 (describing that
holding).
53. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 772–73 (2018).
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Ginsburg wrote that “Dodd-Frank delineates a more circumscribed class; it
defines ‘whistleblower’ to means a person who provides ‘information
relating to a violation of the securities laws to the Commission.’”54 Somers
never made any such disclosures to the SEC, only internally. The Supreme
Court emphasized the more recent whistleblower provision from the Dodd-
Frank Act, stating that Section 78u-6 affords covered whistleblowers both
incentives (e.g., the awards between ten to thirty percent of any monetary
fines) and protections but, in order to receive such incentives and protections,
the whistleblower is required to disclose the violation of the securities laws
to the SEC.55 The Court further disagreed with the SEC in adopting its
Regulation 21F, which provided for two definitions of a “whistleblower.”56
Finally, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning that
requiring a disclosure only to the SEC would narrow the third clause of §78u-
6(h)(1)(A).57 The Supreme Court held that the definition of a
“whistleblower” unequivocally requires the whistleblower to make a
disclosure to the SEC.58
This new Supreme Court decision will obviously affect important issues
connected with the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions, as well as SEC
internal compliance standards adopted under SOX.59 Section 404 of SOX
requires public companies to establish internal systems for employees to
report potential violations to management so that the company can correct
such problems.60 The bounty system for whistleblowers under the Dodd-
Frank Act threatens to undercut the effectiveness of the compliance programs
under Section 404 that require public companies to spend billions of dollars
annually to maintain. This is because the prospect of a large monetary reward
encourages employees to not report potential violations to supervisors,
thereby delaying corrective action.
II. THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY CYCLE—SOME
HISTORY
A. FINANCIAL PANICS IN THEUNITED STATES—THE FIRST 100
YEARS
History tells us that disruptive financial service practices are usually a
triggering event that precedes most economic panics, recessions, and
depressions. This phenomenon first appeared on Wall Street not long after
54. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2012)).
55. Id. at 778.
56. Id. at 781–82.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 777.
59. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 11, 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
60. Id. at § 404 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012)).
2018] Whistleblowers—A Case Study 319
the U.S. government began operations under its then new Constitution. A
panic in 1792 was triggered by the bankruptcy of William Duer, a former
Assistant Treasury Secretary under Alexander Hamilton.61 Duer had been
massively speculating in government bonds and tried to corner the stock
market.62 He was bankrupted when that scheme fell apart, causing
widespread hardship for his many creditors and disrupting the then
unorganized and fledging stock markets in New York, Philadelphia, and
Boston.63 That failure led to the foundation of the NewYork Stock Exchange,
which was created as a private institution that would police its members’
conduct.64
Market downturns became commonplace in the stock markets after
Duer’s failure. The worst panics became recognized by a sobriquet, sort of
like how we recognize hurricanes, except that panics or crashes were named
by the year in which they occurred, instead of by a given name. The Panic of
1837, followed by a six-year economic depression, was one such event.65
“Historians have traditionally attributed the Panic of 1837 to a real estate
bubble and erratic American banking policy.”66 Twenty years later, the Panic
of 1857 was touched off by the failure of the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust
Company, a failure that was caused by embezzlements and speculative
investment losses by its officers.67 “The panic rippled outward as banks
suspended gold payments, stocks plummeted, and thousands of businesses,
including half of New York City’s brokerages, went bankrupt.”68
61. See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 383–84 (2004) (describing this background).
62. Id.
63. ROBERT E. WRIGHT&DAVID J. COWEN, FINANCIAL FOUNDING FATHERS: THEMENWHO
MADEAMERICARICH 65–67 (2006).
64. See CHERNOW, supra note 61, at 383–84.
65. See 1837: The Hard Times, HARV. BUS. SCH. HIST. COLLECTIONS,
https://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/crises/1837.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2017); see also BRAY
HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS INAMERICA: FROM THEREVOLUTION TO THE CIVILWAR 451–
99 (1957) (describing that panic and its effects).
66. HAMMOND, supra note 65, at 451–99.
67. As one source notes:
The financial institution had loaned $5million to railroad builders, and had been swindled
out of millions more by the manager of its New York branch. Unable to pay its extensive
debt to Eastern bankers, Ohio Life was forced into bankruptcy. New York bankers began
to panic for fear that theywould not be able to meet their financial obligations, and shifted
suddenly to hard credit policies. They demanded immediate payment on all mature loans,
refusing to accept promissory notes from merchants and other debtors who were short on
money. Depositors began to withdraw gold from banks, dropping gold reserves by $20
million by mid-September. Hopes for gold from California sunk on September 12 when
the steamer Central America, with its $1.6 million in gold and 400 passengers, was lost
at sea in a hurricane.
On This Day, N.YTIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/harp/1024.html (last
visited Aug. 2, 2017).
68. Id.
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Unemployment “skyrocketed” and the effects of the panic spread to
Europe.69
The Panic of 1873 followed the failure of Jay Cooke & Co., a brokerage
firm that was bankrupted by railroad speculations.70 That panic resulted in
the failure of seventy-three New York Stock Exchange firms and the
bankruptcy of 5,000 mercantile firms.71 A depression followed that lasted for
four years, leading to widespread and violent labor unrest. This panic became
a turning point for governmental responses to panics and depressions.72
Congress sought to prevent future panics through the adoption of legislation
that sought to expand the money supply in order to spur inflation and reduce
the value of debts;73 President Ulysses S. Grant vetoed the legislation.
Thereafter, legislation was adopted that sought the opposite result—a hard
currency policy that would curb inflation.74
That legislation proved to be ineffective as demonstrated by the Panic of
1884, which was ignited by the failure of another high-profile brokerage firm,
Grant & Ward.75 Ironically, in light of his role in the Panic of 1873, former
President and General, Ulysses S. Grant was a partner in that firm, which
failed as a result of the fraudulent actions of another firm member.76 Some
11,000 banks, as well as several brokerage firms, failed in the aftermath of
this panic, and many banks faced “runs” from their depositors.77
Another severe panic occurred almost twenty years later. The Panic of
1893 was marked by the bankruptcy of the Reading Railroad, which was
followed “by the failures of hundreds of banks and businesses dependent
upon the Reading and other railroads. The stock market reacted with a
dramatic plunge.”78 ”The Panic of 1893 was one of the most severe financial
crises in the history of the United States.”79
69. Id.; see generally KENNETHM. STAMPP, AMERICA IN 1857: A NATION ON THEBRINK 213–
34 (1990) (describing the economic effects of this depression).
70. See 1873: Off the Rails, HARV. BUS. SCH. HIST. COLLECTIONS,
https://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/crises/1873.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2017) (describing the causes
of that panic). The leader of that firm, Jay Cooke, was famous for having successfully assumed
responsibility for much of the funding of Union forces during the Civil War. See JERRY W.
MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO
THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900) 293 (2002) [hereinafter MARKHAM, FROM CHRISTOPHER
COLUMBUS].
71. Jennifer 8. Lee, New York and the Panic of 1873, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2008, 9:26 AM),
https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/14/learning-lessons-from-the-panic-of-1873/.
72. Id.
73. Gary Richardson & Tim Sablik, Banking Panics of the Gilded Age: 1863-1913, FED. RES.
HIST. (Dec. 4, 2015), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/banking_panics_of_the_gilded
_age.
74. Id.
75. MARKHAM, FROM CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS, supra note 70, at 301.
76. Id. at 301–02.
77. Id. at 303.
78. Panic of 1893, U.S. HIST., http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h792.html (last visited Aug.
2, 2017).
79. Richardson & Sablik, supra note 73.
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B. FINANCIAL PANICS IN THEUNITED STATES IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY
Panics became a pronounced feature of twentieth century economics.
However, the first of those panics, the Panic of 1907, signaled a sea change
from Congress’ previous hands-off approach to most panics. The Panic of
1907 was triggered by “two minor speculators . . . [who] suffered huge losses
in a failed attempt to corner the stock of United Copper, a copper mining
company . . . . After the collapse of this corner, the banks associated with
these men succumbed to runs by depositors . . . .”80 This led to a crisis of faith
in the banking system throughout the United States.81
Congress responded with a massive investigation of the stock markets.
That investigation sought to determine whether the American economy was
under the control of a “Money Trust” composed of the large Wall Street
bankers.82 Congress concluded that there was indeed such a cabal, which
included J.P. Morgan & Co., and the predecessor firms to what is now
Citigroup.83 Although the stock markets were not regulated as a result of that
crisis, “the panic transformed the way in which Americans viewed the
banking system and the fundamental principles by which it was governed.”84
Indeed, “[t]he panic’s impact is still felt today because it spurred the
monetary reform movement that led to the establishment of the Federal
Reserve System.”85
The creation of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) did nothing to
prevent the next financial crisis, which occurred in October 1929, when the
stock market imploded. In fact, the Fed’s monetary policies were blamed for
exacerbating the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great
Depression.86 “In total, $25 billion—some $319 billion in today’s dollars—
was lost in the 1929 crash . . . . The market . . . then slid again, gliding swiftly
and steadily with the rest of the country into the Great Depression.”87 “It is
the longest and most severe depression experienced by the United States. Its
80. John R. Moen & Ellis W. Tallman, The Panic of 1907, FED. RES. HIST. (Dec. 4, 2015),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/panic_of_1907.
81. Lucy Chen et al., The 1907 Crisis in Historical Perspective, HARV. JOINTCTR. FORHIST. &
ECON., http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~histecon/crisis-next/1907/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2017).
82. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM J.P.
MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900-1970) 47–49 (2002) [hereinafter MARKHAM,
FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR] (describing that investigation).
83. Id.
84. Chen et al., supra note 81.
85. Moen & Tallman, supra note 80.
86. See, e.g., Timothy Cogley,Monetary Policy and the Great Crash of 1929: A Bursting Bubble
or Collapsing Fundamentals?, FED. RES. BANK OF S.F. (Mar. 26, 1999), http://www.frbsf.org/econ
omic-research/publications/economic-letter/1999/march/monetary-policy-and-the-great-crash-of-
1929-a-bursting-bubble-or-collapsing-fundamentals/.
87. Claire Suddath, The Crash of 1929, TIME (Oct. 29, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/nat
ion/article/0,8599,1854569,00.html.
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social and cultural effects are staggering.”88 Some 1,350 banks failed in 1930
alone.89
Franklin Roosevelt won the presidency in 1932 as the Great Depression
gained momentum. He ran for that post on a campaign largely based on his
promise of economic legislation that would bring Wall Street under the
control of the federal government and restore faith in the financial markets.90
The result was the passage of a number of statutes that played a central role
in the regulatory cycle that led to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.
That “New Deal” legislation included the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933
restricting investment banking activities by commercial banks;91 the
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA) that further regulated the
commodity futures exchanges;92 and the federal securities laws, including the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that created the SEC and to which the Dodd-
Frank whistleblower authority was added.93
C. REGULATORYCYCLE EXAMPLE 1: THEGLASS-STEAGALLACT
Exhibit A at any future trial over whether there is such a thing as a
financial regulatory cycle is the Glass-Steagall Act that was enacted in
1933.94 That legislation prohibited commercial banks from, among other
things, acting in the role of investment bankers by underwriting public
securities offerings. The Glass-Steagall Act was widely criticized as over-
regulation and was the subject of much commentary in the literature, both
pro and con.95 Those arguments need not be revisited here, but suffice it to
88. The 1930s, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/about/history/timeline/1930s.ht
ml (last updated Jan. 2, 2014).
89. Jim Luke, Bank Failures: The 1920s and The Great Depression, ECONPROPH (Oct. 26,
2009), https://econproph.com/2009/10/26/fdic-managing-the-crisis-the-fdic-and-rtc-experience/.
90. MARKHAM, FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra note 82, at 165–
72, 177–86.
91. The Glass-Steagall Act was a part of the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48
Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 227 (1988)).
92. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491.
93. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
78a et seq.). Other legislation extending the SEC’s jurisdiction during the Roosevelt administration
included the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa–bbbb) (regulating the administration of corporate bonds issued under trust
indentures); the Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64) (imposing prudential regulation on investment companies,
including mutual funds); and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21) (regulating and registering investment
advisors). Another piece of New Deal legislation enacted in this regulatory cycle was the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-333 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79–79z-6)
(repealed 2005), which gave the SEC prudential control over holding company structure of public
utilities. However, that legislation was repealed in 2005 by Title XII, Subtitle F of the Energy Policy
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
94. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89.
95. See, e.g., Don More, The Virtues of Glass-Steagall: An Argument Against Legislative
Repeal, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 433, 433–34; Jonathan R. Macey, Special Interest Groups
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say that the Glass-Steagall restrictions were gradually undermined over time
through judicial challenges and administrative interpretations that eventually
eviscerated the statute.96 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act formally repealed
Glass Steagall in 1999.97 This completed one regulatory cycle, i.e., restrictive
legislation following a crisis, followed by claims of over-regulation and then
repeal.98
The Financial Crisis of 2008 renewed this particular regulatory cycle.
Claims were then made that commercial banks had entered into high-risk
business activities, such as managing hedge funds and proprietary trading,
which contributed to their failures during the crisis.99 Glass-Steagall style
legislation was then enacted to meet those concerns. Section 619 of the Dodd-
Frank Act required bank regulators to adopt the so-called Volcker Rule
(named after its advocate, a former Fed chairman), which restricted their
proprietary trading and hedge fund activities.100
The Volcker Rule legislation, and the agency rules implementing its
provisions, quickly came under criticism as being either unworkable or
Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33 EMORY L.J. 1, 1–2
(1984); Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist
Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 675, 687–88 (1987);
Bruce Rigelman, Note, National Banks and the Brokerage Business: The Comptroller’s New
Reading of the Glass-Steagall Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 1303, 1306, 1324–35 (1983).
96. See Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—A Test Match for the Bankers, 12 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 1081, 1095–99 (2010) [hereinafter Markham, The Subprime Crisis] (describing that
process).
97. Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley), § 101, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2006)).
98. Banking regulation is replete with other examples of the regulatory cycle. For example,
Savings & Loan Associations (S&Ls) were intensively regulated during the Great Depression,
including requirements limiting the amount of interest they could pay for deposits. Those
restrictions prevented the S&Ls from effectively competing for deposits during the inflationary
period that occurred in the 1970s. Congress then loosened interest rate and investment restrictions
on the S&Ls, many of which engaged in reckless and sometimes fraudulent practices. This created
a financial crisis, and Congress then tightened regulations causing many other S&Ls to fail. See
LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANKING FINANCIAL SERVICE
ACTIVITIES, CASES AND MATERIALS 95–113 (4th ed. 2011) (describing that regulatory cycle). In
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 910 (1996), the Supreme Court imposed liability on
the U.S. government for increasing previously lessened capital requirements for S&Ls during the
S&L crisis.
Regulators have also gone through various iterations for commercial bank capital requirements.
That effort is still a work in progress in the form of Basel I, II and III rules developed internationally
for large banks. The Dodd-Frank Act included special leverage limitation provisions for
systemically significant bank holding companies. See BROOME & MARKHAM, supra at 546–65
(describing that legislation and role of the Basel Committee in setting bank capital requirements).
The Trump administration is reported to be considering changes in those Dodd-Frank Act
provisions. See Dean et al., supra note 5 (describing proposals for such changes).
99. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE
SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION (2006-2009) (2005) [hereinafter MARKHAM, FROM
THE SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THEGREAT RECESSION] (describing hedge fund losses).
100. 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012); see Volcker Rule, BOARD OFGOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/volcker-rule.htm (last updated July 24, 2017)
(describing the scope of that provision).
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ineffective.101 The election of President Donald Trump and the takeover of
Congress by the Republicans in 2016 reopened the debate in Congress over
that legislation.102 At the direction of the new President, the Treasury
Department announced that it is conducting a broad reexamination of the
Dodd-Frank Act with a view of rolling back at least parts of that
legislation.103 The Volcker Rule is a primary target of that effort.104
Ironically, President Trump has also declared that the Glass-Steagall Act
should be revived in order to break up the larger banks.105
D. REGULATORYCYCLE EXAMPLE 2: THECOMMODITY
EXCHANGEACT
The CEA provides another example of the financial services regulatory
cycle. The commodity futures markets were initially regulated by Congress
in 1922 under the Grain Futures Act.106 That legislation was the result of
large-scale grain price manipulations that occurred after World War I.107 The
Grain Futures Act was only lightly applied and proved to be ineffective.108
The regulatory cycle continued after the Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the
onslaught of the Great Depression, during which agriculture prices dropped
sharply. Blame was placed on the inadequacy of existing legislation to
101. See, e.g., Onnig Dombalagian, Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act: Proprietary Trading: Of Scourges, Scapegoats, and Scofflaws, 81 U.
CIN. L. REV. 387 (2012); Alison K. Gary, Note, Creating a Future Economic Crisis: Political
Failure and the Loopholes of the Volcker Rule, 90 OR. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (2012); Andrew F. Tuch,
Financial Conglomerates and Information Barriers, 39 J. CORP. L. 563, 566–67 (2014).
102. Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to Roll Back Obama Era Financial
Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/t
rump-congress-financial-regulations.html.
103. The Treasury Department issued an initial report in June 2017 that considers changes needed
in the regulation of the bank depository system. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, A FINANCIAL
SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS: REPORT TO
PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP (June 2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/A%20Financial%20System.pdf. The Department will be considering the need
to curb other aspects of Dodd-Frank in future reports. Id. at 4. At about the same time, the House of
Representatives approved legislation seeking repeal of parts of the Dodd-Frank Act affecting large
banks. Alan Rappeport, Bill to Erase Some Dodd-Frank Banking Rules Passes in House, N.Y.
TIMES (June 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/business/dealbook/house-financial-
regulations-dodd-frank.html.
104. Lisa Lambert, U.S. Regulators Look at Volcker Rule, A Sign They Hear Wall Street,
REUTERS (May 8, 2017, 7:31 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-banks-trading-idUSKBN
1842H8.
105. Dean et al., supra note 5.
106. The Grain Futures Act, Pub. L. No. 67-331, 42 Stat. 998 (1922) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
107. See Jerry W. Markham, The Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 292–302 (l99l) [hereinafter Markham, The
Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices] (describing that legislation and its failure).
108. Id.
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prevent market manipulators from accentuating those losses.109 The result
was the CEA.110
The cycle of regulation and deregulation soon began anew after
widespread speculation and phenomenal increases in commodity prices in the
1970s led to a demand for more regulation. Congress responded with the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974.111 That legislation
created the CFTC and added intrusive regulation over the commodity
exchanges and their participants.112 That legislation quickly became the
subject of criticism that it was over-regulating the commodity markets.
Among other things, critics claimed that the CEA was impairing the
development of swaps and other economically desirable over-the-counter
derivative instruments.113
Interestingly, the Stock Market Crash of 1987 resulted in no significant
legislative response even though the stock market had dropped farther in
relative and absolute terms than was the case in 1929.114 This was probably
because the market quickly recovered and the economy was not seriously
damaged. Nevertheless, numerous reports by government agencies and
others sought additional legislation.115 Instead of additional regulation,
Congress responded to concerns that regulation would impair the growth of
the swaps market by deregulating the swaps markets in 1992.116 Congress
further loosened CFTC regulation of swaps when it enacted the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).117
This regulatory exemption spurred the growth of credit default swaps,
which played a large role in the Financial Crisis in 2008 and resulted in large
109. JERRY W. MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING AND ITS
REGULATION 12–16 (1987) [hereinafter MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES]
(describing that background).
110. The Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). SeeMarkham, The Manipulation of Commodity Futures
Prices, supra note 107 (describing the background of that legislation).
111. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389
(codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–22 (1976)).
112. See MARKHAM, THE HISTORY OF COMMODITY FUTURES, supra note 109, at 48–80
(describing this background and the scope of the CFTC legislation).
113. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Hybrid Instruments Under the Commodity Exchange
Act - Alternatives Are Needed, 1990 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 1–59 (1990).
114. JerryW. Markham& Rita McCloy Stephanz, The Stock Market Crash of 1987—The United
States Looks at New Recommendations, 76 GEO. L.J. 1993, 2008 (1988) (describing those studies
and lack of legislative response to that crash).
115. See id. (describing those studies and lack of legislative response to that crash).
116. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 6(c)–(d)).
117. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); see also RONALD H. FILLER & JERRY
MARKHAM, REGULATION OF DERIVATIVE FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (SWAPS, OPTIONS AND
FUTURES) 267–81 (2014) (describing the CFMA).
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losses to Wall Street firms.118 Indeed, much of the blame was placed on
trading abuses in swap contracts, particularly credit default swaps.119 Dodd-
Frank then repealed the CFMA’s exemptions for swaps and intensively
regulated those instruments.120 The SEC has only reluctantly acted under that
authority and is still (seven years later) writing rules that would implement
major portions of that legislation.121 The new CFTC chairman appointed by
the Trump administration quickly announced that he would be moving to cut
back that agency’s existing Dodd-Frank swap rules, signaling that the
regulatory cycle will continue.122
E. REGULATORYCYCLE EXAMPLE 3: SECCAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS
The effectiveness of the “New Deal” legislation that created the SEC has
long been a matter of some debate. The SEC has asserted that the federal
securities laws restored confidence in the securities markets, which had been
undermined by the speculation that led up to the Stock Market Crash of
1929.123 However, critics note that the stock market did not recover its 1929
high until twenty-five years later, in November 1954.124 Critics also contend
that the stock market resumed its growth, not because of the creation of the
118. See Markham, The Subprime Crisis, supra note 96, at 1124–30 (describing the growth of
credit default swaps and losses sustained from those instruments during the Financial Crisis).
119. Critics supporting Dodd-Frank claimed that the failure to regulate swaps and other over-the-
counter derivatives was a leading causal factor in the Financial Crisis of 2008, and that their
demands for regulation of those instruments had been shouted down before the crisis. SeeBrooksley
E. Born, Lessons Not Learned-The Derivatives Market and Continued Risks: A Conversation with
Brooksley E. Born and Joseph A. Grundfest, STAN. LAW. (June 7, 2013), https://law.stanford.edu/
stanford-lawyer/articles/lessons-not-learned-the-derivatives-%E2%80%A8market-and-
%E2%80%A9continued-risks/ (describing those claims); see also JERRY W. MARKHAM, A
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM ENRON ERA SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIME
CRISIS (2004-2006) 429–618 (2011) (describing the Financial Crisis of 2008 and the role of credit
default swaps in that event).
120. Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, title VII,
124 Stat. 1641 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 8301–8344 (2012)).
121. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Swap and Other Over-The-Counter Derivative
Contracts, BNA Securities Practice Portfolio Series No. 263 (2014) (describing the SEC and CFTC
swap regulation programs under Dodd-Frank).
122. Gabriel T. Rubin, CFTC Chairman Readies Revamp of Swaps Rules, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11,
2017, 8:04 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-chairman-readies-swaps-rules-revamp-150244
5602.
123. For example, the SEC’s website states that those statutes were “designed to restore investor
confidence in our capital markets by providing investors and the markets with more reliable
information and clear rules of honest dealing.”What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGECOMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last modified June 10, 2013).
124. Gary Richardson et al., Stock Market Crash of 1929, FED. RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/stock_market_crash_of_1929.
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SEC, but because the breakout of the war in Europe restarted the American
economy, which continued its upward course after the war.125
The SEC tried to burnish its role as an aggressive and high-profile
business conduct law enforcement regulator by making insider trading a
crime in the 1960s.126 However, the agency was widely criticized after Wall
Street nearly collapsed in 1969 in the wake of a “paperwork crises” that
“brought our Nation’s securities market to its knees.”127 That crisis was the
result of the fact that brokerage firms regulated by the SEC were unable to
handle the paperwork generated by increased trading volumes. Between 1968
and 1970, some 100 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) firms that were
regulated by the SEC failed.128 Those failures were blamed largely on the
lack of an SEC enforced minimum capital requirement.129
The SEC previously abandoned its own capital requirements in deference
to NYSE capital requirements for it member firms.130 That deregulatory
effort by the SEC was widely criticized and resulted in numerous
amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 after the paperwork
crisis.131 Among other things, that legislation required the SEC to adopt and
enforce a net capital rule for all registered broker-dealers.132 The SEC then
became a more intrusive regulator, but dissatisfaction with that role gave rise
125. See Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal
Securities Laws, 28 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 725, 740–41 (2003) [hereinafter Markham,
Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws] (describing that recovery).
126. Before the SEC acted in 1961, insider trading was not treated as a violation of federal law
or state law. In a leading case decided in 1933, a year before the SEC was created, a state high court
held there was no private right of action for insider trading on an exchange. Compare Goodwin v.
Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933), with Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909) (holding that
there may be insider liability for failure to disclose in certain rare and special circumstances). The
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which formed the SEC, contained only a narrow prohibition on
insider trading that barred insiders from making short-term profits on their company’s stock, but
did not prohibit insiders from profiting from company stock held more than six months. See 15
U.S.C. § 78(p) (2012). Instead of a statutory prohibition, the SEC simply developed the crime of
insider trading a quarter of a century later through an administrative decision that was issued in
connection with the settlement of a case that was not tried or subject to appeal. In re Cady Roberts
& Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961).
127. Securities Processing Act: Hearings on H.R. 14567, H.R. 14826 & S. 3876 Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 92nd Cong.
1 (1972).
128. See MARKHAM, FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra note 82, at
362–66 (describing the paperwork crisis). The value of the stock market was cut in half in the wake
of that event. See JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE
SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM 390 (2005) [hereinafter MARKHAM, FROM ENRON TO
REFORM].
129. MARKHAM, FROM J.P. MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, supra note 82, at 362–
66.
130. SEC, STUDYOFUNSAFEANDUNSOUND PRACTICESOFBROKERS&DEALERS 7 (1971).
131. JERRYW. MARKHAM, A FINANCIALHISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FROM ENRON ERA
SCANDALS TO THE SUBPRIME CRISIS (2004-2006) 159–62 (2011) (describing the paperwork crisis
and reforms).
132. Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97; see also 17 C.F.R. §
240.15c3-1 (the rule adopted by the SEC under that authority).
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to calls for “deregulation” during the administration of President Ronald
Reagan.133
The SEC and other financial services regulators responded by easing
regulations during Ronald Reagan’s two terms in office, and that of George
H.W. Bush.134 Those deregulatory efforts continued into the run up to the
Financial Crisis of 2008. Among other things, the SEC eased capital
requirements for the large investment banks, allowing them to use their own
models to assess what a safe level of capital should be for their individual
risk profiles.135 The large firms allowed to use this reduced capital approach
included Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs and
Morgan Stanley.136During the Financial Crisis of 2008, those firms all failed,
were rescued by other financial institutions, or converted to bank holding
company status. Their breakdowns were blamed on the SEC’s deregulatory
efforts.137 In response, the Dodd-Frank Act imposed almost complete
regulatory control over large financial institutions that are deemed to be
“systemically important financial institutions.”138 This was done through the
creation of a super-regulator, the Financial Stability Oversight Council, that
is tasked with designating such institutions.139 The 2016 elections set the
stage for a renewal of this regulation/deregulation cycle. President Trump has
sought to jumpstart that effort through an executive order directing the
Treasury Department to review that authority for possible repeal or
limitation.140
III. THE REGULATORY CYCLE FORWHISTLEBLOWERS
A. THE SARBANES-OXLEYACT OF 2002
SOX forms the backdrop for the whistleblower regulatory cycle and the
provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act.141 SOX was adopted by Congress in
133. See JERRYW.MARKHAM, A FINANCIALHISTORY OF THEUNITED STATES: FROM THEAGE
OFDERIVATIVES INTO THENEWMILLENNIUM (1970-2001) 95–97 (2002) (describing deregulation
efforts under the Reagan administration).
134. See id.
135. See MARKHAM, FROM THE SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION, supra note 99, at
714–15 (describing that action).
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. Michael S. Gibson, Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, Testimony
before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial
Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: Systemically Important Financial
Institutions and the Dodd-Frank Act (May 16, 2012), available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/gibson20120516a.htm.
139. See id.
140. Jim Puzzanghera, Trump Targets Dodd-Frank Rules Designed to Wall Off Risky Banks, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2017, 12:30 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-trump-financial-regulati
on-20170421-story.html.
141. See The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C.).
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response to the disclosure of widespread accounting fraud at Enron,
WorldCom, and other large public companies.142 Those accounting scandals
involved massive manipulations of the accounting disclosures that are the
most basic premise of the federal securities laws—full and accurate
disclosures of the financial statements of public companies.143 Congress
responded to those scandals by enacting SOX, which created a quasi-
government body, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) to oversee public company auditors.144 Another provision in SOX,
the now infamous Section 404, required public companies to strengthen their
internal accounting controls and required managers to certify the adequacy
of those controls.145 The controls mandated by SOXwere criticized as costing
public companies $5.5 billion annually in additional costs with little positive
showing that those controls were in any way effective.146 Those and other
provisions in SOX were said to be ill-thought out, resulting in “quack
corporate governance” requirements147 and a reflection of what was
described as “Sudden Acute Regulatory Syndrome.”148
Another provision in SOX provided whistleblowing protection to
employees of public companies that report violations of the federal securities
laws. SOX made it illegal for public companies to “discharge, demote,
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an
employee” for engaging in protected whistleblowing activities.149 This
provision was designed to protect employees who reported fraudulent actions
to government regulators, as well as internally within their own company.150
The enactment of the SOX whistleblower provision was a reflection of the
fame given to whistleblowers at Enron and at WorldCom Inc. They had
protested improper accounting actions at their companies and were named
“Persons of the Year” by Time magazine.151 Interestingly, neither the Enron
nor the WorldCom whistleblowers were fired from their jobs, and they did
142. See Markham, Rethinking the Federal Securities Laws, supra note 125, at 740–41
(describing the scandals that led to the enactment of SOX).
143. See MARKHAM, FROM SUBPRIME CRISIS TO THE GREAT RECESSION, supra note 99
(describing that breakdown in full disclosure).
144. About the PCAOB, PUB. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BOARD, https://pcaobus.org/About
(last visited June 15, 2017).
145. MARKHAM, FROM ENRON TO REFORM, supra note 128, at 467 (describing those controls
and their costs).
146. Id.
147. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
148. Larry E. Ribstein, Sarbox: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 279, 293 (2004).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2012).
150. Samuel Leifer, Note, Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the Dodd-Frank Act, 113
MICH. L. REV. 121, 126–27 (2014).
151. See The Whistleblowers: 2002, TIME, http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/articl
e/0,28804,2019712_2019710_2019677,00.html (last visited June 18, 2017).
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not blow a whistle at the SEC. Rather, they expressed their concerns only
internally.152
In any event, the SOX whistleblowing protections proved to be
ineffective. “Empirical research suggests that SOX’s whistleblower
protections have neither effectively encouraged whistleblowers nor
consistently rewarded them for their whistleblowing actions.”153 The reasons
for that failure are manifold, but one of SOX’s shortcomings was the
assignment of its whistleblowing enforcement powers to the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in the Department of Labor. Only
a very small percentage of SOX whistleblower claims adjudicated by OSHA
were successful.154 This was said to be because “[t]he Sarbanes-Oxley Act
had long been construed narrowly by the U.S. Department of Labor and the
courts, leaving many employees uncovered or burdened with proof
requirements that favored defendants.”155
The assignment of enforcement of the SOX whistleblower provisions to
OSHA was, in all events, faulty because the hearing officers at OSHA who
were considering SOX whistleblower claims were ill-suited for this role.
They did not have the expertise to judge, in light of the complexity of the
federal securities laws and arcane accounting standards, whether a
whistleblower was disclosing an actual violation of the securities laws or its
effect on the company’s stock price.156 In addition, OSHA hearing officers
had no subpoena power to investigate claims that a discharge was related to
an employee’s objections to fraudulent accounting or other illegal
activities.157 The purposes of the SOX whistleblowing authority were further
thwarted because that statute only protected claims brought by employees
within ninety days of their termination.158 SOX’s whistleblower remedies
were also criticized as being too restrictive because they were limited to
“reinstatement with the same seniority, back pay with interest, and
compensation for special damages” that may have resulted from any
litigation brought by the employee.159
152. See MARKHAM, FROM ENRON TO REFORM, supra note 128, at 76–78, 344–45, 352
(describing the actions of these whistleblowers).
153. Leifer, supra note 150, at 128.
154. Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-
Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. &MARY L. REV. 65, 67 (2007).
155. Jonathan Ben-Asher, New Developments in Whistleblower Cases Under Sarbanes-Oxley
and Dodd-Frank, American Bar Association Section of Labor and Employment Law Annual
Meeting Boston 1, 6 (Aug. 2014), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/event
s/labor_law/am/2014/3c_ben-asher.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Moberly, supra note 154
(describing shortcomings of the SOX whistleblower provisions).
156. See MARKHAM, FROM ENRON TO REFORM, supra note 128, at 456 (describing those
deficiencies).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Leifer, supra note 150, at 127; see also Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620,
623 (5thCir. 2013) (describing other differences in whistleblower claims brought under SOX versus
those under Dodd-Frank, including differing statutes of limitations).
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B. THEDODD-FRANKWHISTLEBLOWING PROVISIONS RESTART
THEREGULATORYCYCLE
SOX added the initial whistleblower requirement in 2002 in the hope that
it would protect and encourage employees to report uncorrected violative
activities that, if unchecked, could blossom and trigger a financial crisis.
However, SOX failed to prevent the Financial Crisis of 2008. Dodd-Frank
proponents claimed that this was because the SOX whistleblower provisions
were too limited in scope, had been too narrowly applied by OSHA, and did
not contain provisions for whistleblower payments.160 “The financial crisis
in 2008 provides the most vivid case study of this [whistleblowing] failure,
as corporate officers, government regulators, and law enforcement agencies
ignored the warnings of employees who tried to report problems in the
subprime mortgage industry.”161
Despite those claimed shortcomings, the SEC still received tips from
informants. Indeed, the problem was not a lack of tips. Rather, the SEC was
not receptive to such assistance. For example, the agency had been tipped
several times on what was perhaps the largest fraud in all-financial history.
Bernie Madoff was able to carry out that fraud for several years before his
exposure despite some very credible whistleblower claims.162 Those
whistleblowers pointed out that it was impossible for Madoff to have made
the returns he claimed from his purported investment programs for his
clients.163 Ignoring that failure on the part of the SEC, Congress doubled-
down on whistleblowing by granting the SEC and CFTC whistleblower
powers and by adding the bounty feature in Dodd-Frank.164 The
whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank are now caught up in the next phase
of the regulatory cycle, i.e., deregulation. The Trump administration has thus
identified those provisions as a probable target for future review and
cutback.165
IV. SOUND POLICY, NOT REGULATORY CYCLES, SHOULD
DICTATE THE ENACTMENT OF LEGISLATION
The ongoing review of the SEC and CFTC whistleblower programs
should include consideration of at least two policy questions. First, is such a
160. See generally Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblowing Provisions: Ten Years
Later, 64 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2012) (describing those shortcomings).
161. Id. at 4; see also Markham, The Subprime Crisis, supra note 96 (describing the role of
subprime mortgages in the Financial Crisis of 2008).
162. See SEC OFF. OF INVESTIGATIONS, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TOUNCOVER
BERNARD MADOFF’S PONZI SCHEME: PUBLIC VERSION 61–88 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at
https://www.sec.gov/files/oig-509.pdf (describing SEC failures in following up on whistleblowing
tips about the Madoff Ponzi scheme).
163. Id.
164. See Wyatt, supra note 18 (noting that the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions were
partially the result of the Madoff scandal).
165. NATIONAL LAW FORUM, supra note 6.
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bounty program sound public policy, and second, is whistleblowing
effective? The following discussion addresses those questions.
A. WHISTLEBLOWING AS POLICY—SOMEHISTORY
Whistleblowing has not always been viewed as a commendable act or
good policy.166 Indeed, whistleblowers have historically been viewed with
much disdain, especially where a bounty is paid for betraying superiors.167
Disreputable whistleblowers have also betrayed their employers, including
their own government, on political, rather than monetary grounds, but their
motivation is still suspect.168 Totalitarian societies are also usually associated
with suppressing basic freedoms through repressive acts against dissidents
exposed by government informants.169 Whistleblowing in the form of press
leaks has also been a popular political act on the part of government officials.
They leak information in order to undermine government policy or to float
administration proposals in order to test the political winds.170
Whistleblowing through such leaks is controversial—some persons
supporting and some opposing. Whatever the case, monetary rewards in the
form of bounties are not given to these whistleblowers. To the contrary,
unauthorized leakers may lose their government jobs or even be subject to
prosecution for improper disclosure of classified information.171
166. Jonathan Macey, Getting the Word Out About Fraud: A Theoretical Analysis of
Whistleblowing and Insider Trading, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1899, 1901 (2007) (“Whistleblowers, who
traditionally have been considered tattletales and otherwise viewed with suspicion, have recently
enjoyed a distinct rise in popularity.”).
167. Perhaps the most infamous whistleblower was Judas Iscariot, who betrayed Christ for thirty
pieces of silver. Judas Iscariot, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biogr
aphy/Judas-Iscariot (last visited June 16, 2017).
168. For example, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, two politically motivated Soviet Union
sympathizers, were executed for exposing the secret of the atom bomb to that evil empire. See
GEOFFREY PERRET, EISENHOWER 443–44 (1999) (describing the execution of the Rosenbergs).
More recently, an employee of a government contractor to the NSA, Edward Snowden, leaked a
mass of secret government documents to the press. He became a fugitive from justice and was
provided asylum in Russia. See generally Edward J. Epstein, Why President Obama Can’t Pardon
Edward Snowden, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 5, 2017, 7:00 AM) http://www.newsweek.com/why-obama-
wont-pardon-edward-snowden-nsa-538632. The book and movie The Informant documented the
role of a corporate informant the government used to break a price-fixing scheme, only to discover
that the informant had been committing fraud on a fairly massive scale. See KURT EICHENWALD,
THE INFORMANT (2001); see also THE INFORMANT (Warner Brothers Co. 2009).
169. See generally AVIEZER TUCKER, THE LEGACIES OF TOTALITARIANISM: A THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK 89 (2015) (describing the use of informants in the Soviet Union to suppress dissent).
170. “Deep Throat’s” role in bringing down the Nixon administration is now legend. See CARL
BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN passim (1974) (describing that
informant). This form of whistleblowing was most recently demonstrated by leaks from officials in
the intelligence community who are seeking to cripple the Trump administration. Even the fired
Director of the FBI, James Comey, joined the host of leakers. See Comey Testimony: Highlights of
the Hearing, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/08/us/politics/james-
comey-testimony-hearing.html?_r=0.
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 798 (2012) (imposing criminal liability for leaking classified information).
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In another context, criminal law enforcement authorities have long
rewarded “snitches” for providing damaging information about their crime
bosses. Such information is useful, even necessary, for effective law
enforcement. Nevertheless, these whistleblowers are generally depicted as
being despicable and untrustworthy. Unlike SEC and CFTC whistleblowers,
these organized crime informants are not lionized for betraying even the most
detestable mobsters. Such informants are usually paid only small amounts of
money as a bounty, given sentence reductions for their own crimes, or in
extreme cases, given admission to a witness protection program for their
protection from retaliation. Even so, the government has not been entirely
successful in protecting its informants. “Close to 700 witnesses and
informants . . . have been threatened, wounded or killed over a recent three-
year period, a survey found.”172
An exception to the traditional model of offering small amounts for
betraying crime bosses is the large bounties offered for terrorists. “The
Rewards for Justice program, run by the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of
Diplomatic Security, has paid out more than $100 million to over 60 people
since it was created in 1984.”173 However, even large bounties paid for
whistleblowing on the vilest terrorists are not always effective. For example,
the U.S. government offered a bounty of $25 million for the apprehension of
Osama bin Laden, but he was not captured and killed until nearly a decade
after that reward was offered.174 Even then, apparently, no one qualified for
a bounty in his takedown.175
Another change in the governmental approach to whistleblowers
occurred in 1986 when the False Claims Act was amended to allow the
payment of bounties to third parties exposing efforts to defraud the
government.176 Formerly, that legislation sought only to protect
whistleblowers from retaliation by their employers. The 1986 amendments
went further by authorizing rewards in the form of bounties to whistleblowers
uncovering fraudulent government contractor claims, regardless of whether
the whistleblower was subjected to adverse action by their employer.177 This
became the model for the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.
172. Jacob Gershman, Why Life for ‘Snitches’ Has Never Been More Dangerous, WALL ST. J.
(June 20, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/criminals-subvert-online-court-records-to-
expose-snitches-1497960000.
173. Ben Rooney,Who Gets Bin Laden’s $25 Million Bounty?, CNNMONEY (May 2, 2011, 6:24
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/05/02/news/osama_bin_laden_reward/index.htm.
174. Matthew Cole,U.S. Will Not Pay $25 Million Osama Bin Laden Reward, Say Officials, ABC
NEWS (May 19, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/osama-bin-laden-reward-paid/story?id=1363
3236.
175. Id.
176. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (1988).
177. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 273–74
(1992) (describing that change in approach to whistleblowing).
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B. DODD-FRANKWHISTLEBLOWERS AND PUBLIC POLICY
1. Is Whistleblowing Justified on Monetary Grounds?
In contrast to the typical criminal snitch, whistleblowers in public
companies and at firms otherwise regulated by the SEC and CFTC, have been
given hero status in the press and richly rewarded for exposing their
employers. “While our society still attaches many negative stigmas to
whistleblowers, several recent corporate scandals have instigated a shift in
perspective towards acceptance of and even praise for whistleblowers . . .
.”178 Nevertheless, these whistleblowing programs have their critics.
Whistleblowing under SOX has been equated with insider trading by one
scholar.179 Another critic charged that, “[i]n effect, the Dodd-Frank Act’s
whistleblower laws transform corporate corruption into a ‘gold mine’ by
giving individuals the opportunity to reap enormous benefits from reporting
alleged violations.”180
The effectiveness of the SEC whistleblower program may be judged in
light of its successes or lack thereof. In fiscal year 2016, the SEC received
over 4,200 whistleblower tips, a forty percent increase over the first year of
the program, which began in 2012.181 By extrapolating these figures, it
appears that the SEC has probably received over 10,000 tips since the
implementation of its whistleblower program. However, between 2012 and
2016, the SEC considered only some ninety-nine whistleblower claims for
possible bounties.182 Of that number, sixty-four bounty claims were denied
by the SEC and only thirty-five awards were granted.183 This small number
of successful whistleblower claims appears to mirror the statistical success
of a lottery. It also pales in comparison to the fact that the SEC brought nearly
550 enforcement actions during that same period that were independent of
any whistleblower assistance.184
178. Christina Pellino, Note, Don’t Whistle While You Work—Unless You Whistle to the SEC, 46
SETONHALL L. REV. 911, 915–16 (2016).
179. Macey, supra note 166, at 1901 (“Whistleblowers, who traditionally have been considered
tattletales and otherwise viewed with suspicion, have recently enjoyed a distinct rise in
popularity.”).
180. Jenny Lee, Note, Corporate Corruption & the New Gold Mine: How the Dodd-Frank Act
Overincentivizes Whistleblowing, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 303, 305 (2011).
181. See SEC 2016 ANNUALREPORT, supra note 26.
182. See Final Orders of the Commission, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, OFF. OF THE
WHISTLEBLOWER, www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/owb-final-orders.shtml (last modified Aug. 25,
2017). By May 2017, the number of SEC awards to whistleblowers increased to a still paltry forty-
three individuals. Whistle-Blower Collects Nearly $4M from SEC, 49 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
688 (May 1, 2017).
183. See Final Orders of the Commission, supra note 182.
184. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2016 (Oct. 11, 2016),
available at https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-212.html [hereinafter SEC 2016 Press
Release].
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This raises the question of whether the game is worth the candle, as is the
case for other governmental tipster programs. For example, the Bank Secrecy
Act requires financial services institutions to file suspicious activity reports
(SARs) with the government that disclose business activities on the part of
the institutions’ private clients that might be illegal.185 In 2014, over 1.7
million SARs were filed by reporting financial services firms reporting
suspicious business activities by their clients.186 Those reports were
accessible to over 380 local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.187
It is unknown how many prosecutions resulted from this massive invasion of
privacy, but that number appears to be extremely small in comparison to the
number of reports filed. There is also some disturbing data available from
another mandatory whistleblowing requirement, i.e., the filing of currency
reports for transactions in excess of $10,000. One press report asserted that
this mandatory informant program resulted in the filing of over 77 million
currency reports between 1987 and 1996.188 Yet, only 580 convictions out of
77 million filed reports were obtained from all of those filings.189 This
massive invasion of privacy of the private financial information of clients of
financial institutions has also proved expensive because such reports take
some time to complete.190
The SEC whistleblower program has resulted in the recovery of a large
sum of fines, i.e., more than $953 million in financial remedies were obtained
in those whistleblower-induced enforcement actions.191 From that amount,
over $150million in whistleblower payments were made, an award allocation
averaging about fifteen percent of the fines levied in those actions.192 The
SEC has asserted that it believes “that the continued payment of significant
awards . . . will continue to incentivize company insiders, market participants,
and others with knowledge of potential securities law violations to come
forward and report their information to the agency.”193 Some perspective
is needed in assessing the validity of the SEC claims of success for its
whistleblowing program. The total recovery amount is only about five
percent of the total disgorgement and penalties ordered in all SEC
185. See JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BROKER DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER
SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW: FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES, CREDIT REGULATION, AND
CUSTOMER PROTECTION Ch. 7 (2016) (describing these and other money laundering enforcement
tools). This is a mandatory whistleblowing program that does not make bounty payments. However,
financial service firms are incentivized to file these reports because they will be sanctioned for
failing to do so. Id. (describing these and other money laundering enforcement tools).
186. FINCEN, SAR STATS TECHNICALBULLETIN 2 (Oct. 2015).
187. Id. at 1.
188. Richard W. Rahn, Financial Privacy in Peril, WALL ST. J., June 1, 1999, at A22.
189. Id.
190. Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: A Burden on Financial Institutions,
19 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 437, 457 (1994).
191. Whistleblower Awards Over $150 Million, supra note 27.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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enforcement actions from 2012 to 2016.194 The remedies in non-
whistleblower actions averaged over $4 billion per year between 2014 and
2016,195 and over $3 billion per year in 2012 and 2013.196 The whistleblowing
recoveries are thus only a small portion of the SEC’s enforcement program,
and the awards went only to a small number of recipients. Query, should the
SEC issue a greater number of awards from claims provided by
whistleblowers, or should the SEC be more definitive in disclosing that only
a very small number of whistleblower filed claims will result in an award?
Moreover, while the large absolute numbers for SEC enforcement
recoveries from both whistleblowing and independent actions might sound
impressive, without more, their usefulness in measuring the value of
whistleblowing is subject to criticism. This is because most of the SEC’s
fines and remedies are gathered through settlements in which the settling
party neither admits nor denies the SEC’s charges.197 In the wake of the
Financial Crisis of 2008, public companies, financial services firms in
particular, were assaulted by enforcement actions brought by the SEC,
CFTC, and a host of other regulators.198 The costs of settlements imposed by
regulators in those actions just for the sixteen largest banks, which are public
companies, collectively totaled more than $320 billion by the end of 2016.199
194. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Enforcement Results for FY 2013 (Dec. 17,
2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2013-264 [hereinafter SEC 2013 Press
Release]; see also SEC 2016 Press Release, supra note 184.
195. See SEC 2016 Press Release, supra note 184.
196. See SEC 2013 Press Release, supra note 194.
197. The SEC also gathers monies assessed in proceedings conducted before its administrative
law judges (ALJs). In those proceedings, the SEC acts as the complainant, the SEC staff as
prosecutor, the SEC ALJ as judge and jury, and the SEC conducts the appellate review from the
decisions of its ALJs to which the courts defer when an appeal is taken from the agency. See Jerry
W. Markham, Regulating the U.S. Treasury Market, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 185, 225–27 (2016)
(proposing restrictions on such internal agency administrative proceedings).
198. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulating the “Too Big to Jail” Financial Institutions, 83 BROOK.
L. REV. 517 (2018) [hereinafter Markham, Too Big to Jail] (describing these actions). The regulators
demanding those settlements were numerous state, federal and foreign authorities including the
Department of Justice, SEC, CFTC, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve
Board (Fed), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Treasury Department, Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, Federal Housing Finance Agency, National Credit Union Administration,
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, Office of Foreign Assets Control, and Department of Labor. State attorney
general wolf packs, from forty-nine states, plus the District of Columbia, and various local
municipal prosecutors and state pension fund administrators also participated in many of these
settlements. Particularly active at the state level were attorneys general fromNew York and the New
York Superintendent of Financial Services. Foreign regulators demanding settlements included the
UK Financial Conduct Authority and regulators from Switzerland, Netherlands and the European
Union. Id. at 517–18.
199. Ben McLannahan, Banks’ Post-Crisis Legal Costs Hit $300bn, FIN. TIMES (June 7, 2015),
https://www.ft.com/content/debe3f58-0bd8-11e5-a06e-00144feabdc0; Karen Friefeld, Arno
Schuetze & Kathrin Jones, Deutsche Bank Agrees to $7.2 Billion Mortgage Settlement with U.S.,
REUTERS (Dec. 23, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-deutsche-bank-mortgages-settlement-
idUSKBN14C041;World’s Biggest Banks Fined $321 Billion Since Financial Crisis, 49 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 395 (Mar. 6, 2017). In addition to those payments, the targeted firms had to pay
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Yet, no executives at those firms were charged with a crime.200 Even in cases
where lower-level employees were charged, the Department of Justice has
had a remarkable lack of success in contested cases.201
These huge settlements were forced because the large public companies
targeted for SEC enforcement actions receive little sympathy in the courts or
in SEC administrative proceedings.202 These institutions also do not want to
gamble on the collateral estoppel effects of a successful SEC enforcement in
the class action suits that inevitably piggy-back on the SEC cases.203 Those
companies also do not want to have their executives charged with violations
by the government, in proceedings where anti-Wall Street bias is feared, and
not unlikely.204 Consequently, claims of success based on whistleblower
recoveries must be tempered with this element of coercion from the
government, which raises several questions. With the new Supreme Court
decision in Somers, which clearly requires a whistleblower to file a claim
directly with the SEC, will whistleblowers stop filing any internal claims now
and only file them directly with the SEC? How will this decision impact
public companies that have strong internal compliance and reporting
regimes? Will this decision adversely affect their efforts to try and do the
right thing? Will such companies continue to adopt policies that encourage
their employees to report internally but still not retaliate against them if they
only report any such law violations to the SEC?
2. Are Bounties Inconsistent with the Internal Risk Controls
Mandated by SOX?
The integrity of the whistleblower bounty programs is fairly criticized on
other grounds in assessing whether a rollback of Dodd-Frank in this area is
appropriate. Whistleblowers are now being offered bounties that sometimes
amount to millions of dollars. Instead of protecting whistleblowers from
retaliation by management, this bounty system gives every employee with a
grudge against their employer a strong motive to exact a lucrative revenge.
Employees of public companies dismissed for performance failures also have
a strong motive to claim a violation in order to retain their job and receive a
large reward. This raises the issue of how public companies can be protected
from whistleblower claims that have no merit or that are based on bad
billions of dollars in attorney fees in response to the investigations that led to those payments. They
were also forced to pay for “corporate monitors” selected by the government, that were often
required to be employed by the settling party to oversee corporate management in its compliance
efforts.
200. Markham, Too Big to Jail, supra note 198, at 518–19.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 575–76.
203. See generally MARKHAM, FROM ENRON TO REFORM, supra note 128 (describing class
action abuses and concerns for public companies).
204. See Markham, Too Big to Jail, supra note 198 (describing these reasons for SEC and other
financial services regulatory fines).
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motives. Query, should such frivolous claims be subject to a fine, as each
such claim can be quite costly for the SEC to research, or does the public
interest test permit any and all claims regardless of their merits?
These whistleblowing powers of the SEC and CFTCwill also be assessed
by critics in the context of a larger picture that includes the massive
compliance costs imposed on public companies by government regulations.
The inclusion of whistleblower authority to the already intrusive financial
regulatory arsenal will be claimed by critics to be just another part of a
continuing effort to impose multiple layers of regulations that intrude into
every aspect of company management.
The harshest critics contend that the SEC whistleblower program is
inconsistent with the provisions of Section 404 of SOX that mandate
extensive internal risk controls.205 In order to meet the requirements of
Section 404, employees are required to periodically certify whether they are
aware of any violations. If so, they must report them to their supervisors.
Lower-level supervisors then report up through the management chain until
those concerns reach appropriate senior managers and even the board of
directors.206 The apparent goal of this reporting system is to assure early
detection and correction of violations, so as to limit its effects on shareholders
and victims of any fraud. This system also apparently seeks to encourage
early self-reporting of those violations by a company to the SEC, where
“cooperation” with the government will result in the reduction of penalties
that are ultimately borne by shareholders.
The SOX anti-retaliation provision covers employees who report fraud
not only to the SEC, but also to any other federal agency, Congress, or an
internal supervisor of the employer.207 If Section 404 mandates are to be
effective, both should be required. That is, employees should be required to
first report possible violations to their employer. If no action is taken, the
employee should then be allowed to report the violations to the SEC or CFTC
without fear of retaliation or harassment. If retaliatory action is taken against
employees, they could seek redress through a private action. That approach
is consistent with the goals of SOX Section 404 and will remove the
motivation of employees for not reporting violations or delaying reports in
hopes that the severity of the violations will result in the receipt of a large
monetary bounty from the SEC.
3. Whistleblowing vs. Internal Reporting
Internal and external reporting requirements for whistleblowers sought
to further Section 404’s goals of effective internal controls for identifying
and reporting violations. However, this begs the question of whether
205. See Divided U.S. SEC Approves Whistleblower Rule, supra note 4.
206. See generally Romano, supra note 147 (critiquing the goal of Section 404 of SOX).
207. Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 778 (2018).
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whistleblowers should be given a lottery size payout for exposing what they
are, in any event, required by law to report to their employer under Section
404. One or the other of these mandates need to go, and Section 404 should
not be excluded as the appropriate target if the whistleblower award program
is not repealed or limited. Query, will the recent Supreme Court decision in
Somers significantly reduce any internal reporting in the future?
The SEC is regarded by those seeking deregulation to be a particularly
intrusive regulator. It requires every public company to report to it quarterly
on financial results and other matters that affect the company. SOX Section
404 deepened that intrusion by deputizing public companies as investigators
for the SEC at great expense to the shareholders of public companies. That
requirement and other SEC intrusions did nothing to prevent the Financial
Crisis of 2008. Consequently, it is hard to justify the massive expenses
associated with that program, particularly if the whistleblower provisions are
retained.
This self-deputization approach to regulation has been expanded in other
ways. Among other things, Dodd-Frank requires public companies to act as
surrogates in pushing various political agendas. For example, Dodd-Frank
requires disclosures by public companies on whether they are trafficking in
conflict minerals.208 Another politically-motivated requirement in Dodd-
Frank is that public companies publish in their SEC filings a ratio that
compares management compensation to that of their average workers.209
Efforts have also been conducted by the SEC to inject itself into the highly
charged debate over climate change by requiring disclosures detailing how
the operations of public companies are being affected by global warming.210
The SEC’s whistleblowing program in combination with Section 404 of SOX
simply adds fuel to the debate over whether that agency has far exceeded its
original mandate of providing disclosures describing its financial status and
market risks through the expansion of required disclosures into political
debates over the role of business in society.
208. According to widespread leaks, the Trump administration is considering rescinding a rule
adopted by the SEC pursuant to Dodd-Frank that requires conflict minerals disclosures. It is unclear
whether these leaks are whistleblowing or authorized disclosures made to test the political winds on
this issue. Sarah N. Lynch & Emily Stephenson, White House Plans Directive Targeting ‘Conflict
Minerals’ Rule Sources, REUTERS (Feb. 8. 2017), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
conflictminerals-idUSKBN15N06N.
209. See generally Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rule for Pay Ratio Disclosure (Aug. 5,
2015), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html; see also Jerry W.
Markham, Excessive Executive Compensation—Why Bother?, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 277 (2007)
(describing the ineffectiveness and futility of the SEC’s efforts to regulate executive compensation).
210. See generally Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Interpretive Guidance on Disclosure Related
to Business or Legal Developments Regarding Climate Change (Jan. 27, 2010), available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-15.htm.
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CONCLUSION
While the SEC has been by far the more aggressive regulatory agency in
connection with whistleblower programs in the post-Dodd-Frank era, it is
expected that both the SEC and the CFTC will continue to highlight and
support their respective whistleblower programs. In considering the rollback
of Dodd-Frank, Congress will be weighing the value of those programs
against their effects in undermining the self-policing required by Section 404
of SOX. If SOX Section 404 is to be maintained, any continued
whistleblower programs should require employees to first bring potential law
violations to the attention of senior management. Such incentives may allow
early self-correction, reduction of harmful effects from violations, and
amelioration of punitive enforcement penalties. It will be interesting to see
how the SEC, or even the CFTC, changes its whistleblower programs in light
of the new Supreme Court decision in Somers.
